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Abstract: The literature on entrenchment as a means to achieve constitutional endurance 
has grown in recent years, as has the scholarship on unamendable provisions as a 
mechanism intended to safeguard the constitutional project. However, little attention has 
been paid to the promise and limits of eternity clauses in transitional settings. Their appeal 
in this context is great. In an effort to safeguard hard-fought agreements, drafters often 
declare unamendable what they consider the fundamentals to the political deal: the number 
of presidential term limits, the commitment to human rights and to democracy, the form of 
the state (whether republican or monarchical), the territorial integrity of the state, the 
territorial division of power, secularism or the official religion. This article explores the 
distinctive role and problems posed by eternity clauses in transitional constitution-building, 
as guarantees of the pre-constitutional political settlement in such fragile periods. The 
article also compares unamendability to other techniques of constitution-making in 
uncertain times, such as sunset clauses, deferring hard choices and other forms of 
constitutional incrementalism. 
Keywords: constitutional amendment; eternity clauses; Tunisia; political transitions; political 
settlements 
 
I. Introduction 
Institutional mechanisms adopted in search of the twin goals of legitimacy and longevity of constitutions 
show great variety. Within that variety, constitutional amendment procedures have gained increasing 
attention in recent scholarship, having been called just as important as ‘standard topics of institutional 
design’.1 Their multiple purposes include entrenching the constitution, structuring its change, and 
‘precommitting’ political actors, but such clauses also serve as sites of expression of constitutional 
values.2 Within these, unamendable provisions (also known as ‘eternity clauses’) have also attracted 
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 Sanford Levinson, ‘Designing an Amendment Process’ in John Ferejohn et al., Constitutional Culture and 
Democratic Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 275.  
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 Richard Albert, ‘The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules’, McGill Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 2 
(2013), pp. 230-31. See also, generally, Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, 
Citizenship, Culture, and Community, New York: Routledge, 2010 and Gary J. Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010 (both discussing unamendable provisions as embodying 
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constitution-makers’ interest.3 They are a type of constitutional provision or judicial doctrine which 
insulates from amendment certain principles or rights enshrined in a constitution. They represent a 
special mechanism of constitutional entrenchment, one which might be termed indefinite or limitless. 
The example of an eternity clause typically given is Germany, whose Article 79(3) or Ewigkeitsklausel 
declares the inviolability of human dignity and of human rights, as well as of the democratic, federal, 
and social nature of the German state, the electoral nature of the German democracy, and the rule of 
law. There are also judicial doctrines of implied substantive limits on amendment, such as India’s basic 
structure doctrine or the Czech Constitutional Court’s substantive core doctrine.4 Such judicial 
constructs are informed by analogous considerations and operate in a similar fashion to formal clauses. 
The rise of formal unamendable provisions has been constant in constitutions around the world, with 
one study estimating that 42 per cent (or 82 out of 192) of post-World War II constitutions adopted until 
2011 incorporate some type of eternity clause, and 32 per cent (or 172 out of 537) of constitutions of all 
time doing so.5 Even more significantly, this trend does not appear to be abating. The two most recently 
adopted constitutions—Tunisia’s 2014 and Nepal’s 2015 constitutions—both incorporated formally 
unamendable clauses. The spread of judicial doctrines of unamendability has similarly continued, with 
the Pakistani Supreme Court adopting its own version of a basic structure doctrine in 2015.6 
Significantly, their incidence amidst post-conflict and post-authoritarian constitutions seems to suggest 
that eternity clauses have become an especially attractive tool to constitution-makers.  
In what follows, I propose to examine the rise of unamendable commitments in constitutions resulting 
from political transitions and to suggest a third goal they pursue in these contexts: that of facilitating 
and later safeguarding a political settlement. The technique of taking certain agreements off the table in 
a nascent constitution has long been employed as a mechanism of constitutional design in transitional 
situations.7 In such contexts, a political agreement between rival parties is both hard-fought and 
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especially fragile. As such, I will argue, the promise of constitutional unamendability is taken as a 
guarantee of the terms of the agreement both before and after the adoption of the new fundamental 
law.  
This role of eternity clauses—as themselves an instrument of political negotiation and conflict 
resolution—has thus far been ignored by the growing literature on unamendability. Insofar as this 
literature has addressed their inclusion in post-conflict constitutions, it has focused on ‘reconciliatory’ 
elements such as unamendable amnesties,8 without considering the different dynamics of post-conflict 
constitution-making and the resulting difference in justifications for, and expectations from, 
unamendability in these basic laws. One author has noted the role of higher amendment thresholds in 
facilitating ‘a political bargain entered into by the constitutional designers for the sake of ratifying an 
otherwise “unratifiable” constitution.’9 The case he discusses is that of the US constitution’s 
entrenchment of state voting rights in Article V, explaining the heightened level of protection as a 
condition precedent to the Union itself.10  Beyond this insight, however, the literature on eternity 
clauses has not explored how they may condition political compromises underlying constitution-making 
today. This article seeks to fill this gap by investigating the bargaining dynamics conditioning political 
settlements in the contexts where most of today’s new constitutions are being written: post-conflict and 
post-authoritarian transitions.  
The article further argues that eternity clauses pose problems of a different nature from other conflict 
resolution techniques which have found their way into constitutions. If taken seriously, these clauses 
remain at the heart of the political settlement, both as the embodiment of its core elements and as 
guarantees of the settlement’s survival. Unamendability, however, is a qualitatively different choice 
from deep entrenchment such as a supermajority requirement for constitutional amendment or a 
sunset clause. It purports to forever close off certain avenues for constitutional change in a manner 
which may safeguard the political settlement in the first instance but severely frustrate its development 
further down the road—in particular when longer-term demands of peace require the elite pact to give 
way to some more normative commitment to constitutionalism.    
In part because eternity clauses are a fairly common constitutional feature, constitution-makers in post-
conflict settings may not always be aware of the full array of implications flowing from the inclusion of 
such clauses in constitutions, nor of how these provisions fit within the broader constitutional 
architecture—notably with institutions for constitutional openness (such as legislative initiative 
provisions) and for constitutional enforcement (such as constitutional review). Formal unamendability 
tends to result in the empowerment of constitutional courts, by way of constitutional review of 
amendments on substantive grounds, in a manner these bodies may not have been equipped for. In this 
sense, then, this article also links to the contributions of Jenna Sapiano and Tom Gerald Daly in this issue 
and their studies of the judicial role in the jurisprudence of peace and democratisation. 
I proceed by first outlining the prospects and limits of eternity clauses as mechanisms of constitutional 
rigidity, and how these may be influenced by the special dynamics of political settlements in conflict-
affected and post-authoritarian contexts. I then propose to look at substantive elements declared 
unamendable by taking Tunisia’s recently adopted constitution as an example. I explore the complex 
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bargaining behind the adoption of Tunisian unamendable provisions in their final form. I also suggest 
that the choices of what to declare unalterable in the basic law mirror the concerns of constitution-
makers in other post-authoritarian and post-conflict settings. Thus, declarations of immutability of 
certain fundamental characteristics of the state, of human rights commitments, or of executive term 
limits are frequent in emerging or fragile democracies and there is growing evidence of how these 
operate in practice. Eternity clauses may thus be read as indicators of what drafters have considered to 
be the ‘public goods of constitutionalism’ which Christine Bell discussed in her article. However, they 
may simultaneously operate to reduce the risk for elites in entering the new dispensation: presidential 
term limits and human rights provisions appear to give some protection against either party using the 
new order to reinstate or achieve a reversion to domination. Unlike in the Tunisian constitution, 
amnesties granted to former warring parties are also sometimes constitutionalised as unamendable and 
I briefly touch upon these as a more overt confirmation of the elite pact.  
The final part of the article explores potential alternatives to eternity clauses in post-conflict 
constitutions. Rather than aiming at prescriptive conclusions, this section considers alternate design 
choices which also pursue constitutional legitimacy and endurance. These include: interim constitutions 
(discussed in greater depth by Charmaine Rodrigues in this issue); sunset clauses; as well as deferral; 
deliberate ambiguity; or silence. Where evidence is available, I explain why these were not chosen in 
Tunisia but were preferred in other transitional contexts. Based on this brief analysis, I suggest that 
more work is needed in order to evaluate the extent to which these options are viable alternatives to 
unamendability’s capacity to broker, and promise to safeguard, the political settlement. The article 
concludes by reiterating the need to complement our understandings of the recourse to unamendability 
in constitution-making with insights from post-conflict and post-authoritarian processes. Within these, 
eternity clauses play a distinctive and possibly unique role as guarantees of the pre-constitutional 
political settlement and as such may be justified on political and not merely normative grounds.  
 
II.  Constitution-making in political transitions 
Constitution-making in political transitions as referred to in this article pertains to both post-conflict and 
post-authoritarian contexts in which a democratic constitution is adopted with a view to entrenching a 
new political settlement. As the introductory piece to this symposium makes clear, there are overlaps 
between the burdens placed on post-conflict and democratisation constitutions: they both must 
accommodate antagonists—whether warring parties or powerful elites—and introduce new political 
and legal institutions which can navigate between old and new political settlements. Understanding the 
politics of doing politics in fragile and conflict-affected states is a key step towards untangling the 
delicate and often seemingly contradictory compromises enshrined in their resulting constitutions. I 
acknowledge here that the concept of transition to democracy is itself problematic, seeing as it relies on 
a thin notion of democracy and on a workable distinction between a non-democratic starting point and 
a democratic end point.11 Daly in this special issue provides a more comprehensive explanation of the 
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utility of the concept of transition, as well as of the broader concept of democratisation. For the 
purposes of this article, the reader should retain the use of ‘transition constitution-making’ as an 
umbrella-concept denoting the processes of negotiating, drafting, and ratifying new constitutions in 
countries emerging from violent conflict or authoritarian regimes. 
Several distinctive features of post-conflict and post-authoritarian constitution-making can be 
considered likely to have an impact on the negotiation and content of eternity clauses. While these are 
not necessarily exclusive to such transitional context, they tend to be exacerbated in such a setting. I will 
highlight three such features. 
First, the constitution-making process may be more contested than constitutional reform in established 
democracies, and as such the legitimacy of the final product may be more readily called into question. 
The threat of a return to violence, or indeed, the continued violence as background to constitutional 
negotiations, have an impact on both the process and the substance of constitutions drafted in these 
conditions. The timeframe for negotiations may thus be shorter; the chance of compromise smaller due 
to heightened polarisation and potential imbalances of power; and the pressure on the constitution to 
‘deliver’ greater.12 On the one hand, negotiating fundamental constitutional norms of the sort included 
in eternity clauses may not be ideal in such a setting. As Vivien Hart has argued, Canada could sustain 30 
years of constitutional conversation around Quebec and secession, but Northern Ireland or South Africa 
could not hope to do the same.13 On the other hand, and as this article will later argue, it is precisely 
agreement on those fundamentals, and on their immutability, which may ensure that a political 
settlement is reached at all and a constitution is adopted. Eternity clauses thus embody the potential 
tension between the political pacts having made the  new constitution possible and the normative 
elements of the constitutional framework. 
Second, the functions post-conflict and post-authoritarian constitutions are expected to play are 
complex. Post-conflict constitutions are expected to  
drive the transformative process from conflict to peace, seek to transform the society from one 
that resorts to violence to one that resorts to political means to resolve conflict, and/or shape 
the governance framework that will regulate access to power and resources—all key reasons for 
conflict. [They] must also put in place mechanisms and institutions through which future conflict 
in the society can be managed without a return to violence.14 
Post-authoritarian constitutions are similarly tasked with instituting a new political regime, whose 
viability may well be determined by the ‘momentous decisions’ of the constitution-makers.15 In addition 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the end point of a democratic transition) and, broadly, Juan J. Linz, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1990), pp. 143-64. 
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 See Jennifer Widner, ‘Constitution-Writing in Post-conflict Settings: An Overview’, William and Mary Law Review, 
Vol. 49, No. 4 (2008), pp. 1513-41. 
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 Vivien Hart, ‘Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict’, Peace & Change, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2001), p. 
165. 
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 Kirsti Samuels, ‘Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making’, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 
26, No. 2 (2006), p. 2. 
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 Bonime-Blanc (2010), p. 422. 
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to the institutional engineering other constitutions are expected to provide, post-conflict and post-
authoritarian basic laws are also tasked with providing recognition—they are ‘to recognize, include, give 
voice to, equalize, or advantage, and to exclude, silence, or stigmatize people and peoples.’16 These 
constitutions thus bear the dual burden of encapsulating an elite pact while also performing the role of a 
peace agreement.17 As will be seen below, certain types of eternity clauses are distinctly aimed at 
achieving reconciliation, such as those enshrining amnesties as unamendable. Others, including 
unexpected ones such as unamendable commitments to religion, may also be read as rectifying past 
oppression.  
Third and finally, in all cases of post-conflict and post-authoritarian drafting, the resulting constitutions 
are ‘heavily negotiated outcome[s], often involving an exchange of incommensurables rather than a 
coherent plan for conflict reduction.’18 Such constitution-making takes place in times of crisis and is 
shaped by the constraints resulting from this, by the numerous biases of drafters, as well as by generally 
weak institutional capacity.19 As a consequence, what results is more often ‘partial or even conflicting 
innovations’ rather than ‘the adoption of coherent designs whose elements reinforce each other.’20 
Given this likely incoherence, eternity clauses may not play the role of structuring devices they have 
performed in other constitutional orders, such as Germany.21 Declaring a hierarchy of norms within the 
constitution, atop of which are certain unamendable principles, may prove more problematic in a 
disjointed document. The case of Tunisia’s unamendable commitment to Islam as its official religion, 
sitting as it does alongside protections of religious freedom but also of the state’s role as guardian of 
religion, will serve as an illustration of such potential incompatibilities. 
Other articles in this issue, notably those by Rodrigues and Sapiano, take up the distinctiveness of post-
conflict constitution-making and responses to it more fully. Daly engages with the democratisation 
context more generally to discuss the heavy burdens placed on constitutional courts in new and fragile 
democracies. My analysis, while acknowledging the distinctiveness of the transitional setting, will also 
seek to identify overlaps—in aims, mechanisms, and implementation—between eternity clauses 
resulting from post-conflict and post-authoritarian constitution-making and those adopted in more 
peaceful times. As such, examples used to illustrate the promises and limits of eternity clauses will not 
be limited to unamendability in post-conflict constitutions. This approach warns against easy 
assumptions over what might or might not work in post-conflict and post-authoritarian constitutions 
and acknowledges that all constitutions, to an extent, are the product of (often violent) crisis.22 All 
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constitution-makers are concerned with achieving durability, and for the constitution to ensure societal 
stability. However, the distinctiveness of the transitional context becomes clear when one understands 
eternity clauses as facilitating bargaining and compromise during negotiations and as constitutionalising 
the sine qua nons of the political settlement. To the extent that this settlement would not have been 
possible without it, unamendability thus shows itself as especially attractive in transitional settings and 
justifiable on strategic and political rather than normative grounds. 
 
III. Tunisia’s 2014 constitution and unamendable commitments in post-conflict constitutions 
Tunisia’s 2014 constitution is one of two recently adopted basic laws incorporating a formal eternity 
clause (the other is Nepal’s constitution, ratified in September 2015, whose Article 274 serves this 
function). It was drafted during an intensive and prolonged process, following the ousting of president 
Ben Ali and the so-called ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in 2011.23 Heavy expectations loomed over the 
constitutional assembly elected in October 2011, which simultaneously had to draft a new fundamental 
law and act as transitional legislative body.24 Opinions differed widely on how long the assembly had to 
deliberate,25 though in the end it completed its work in two years. The final constitution was adopted in 
January 2014 by a two-thirds majority of the assembly but was not submitted to popular referendum. It 
would bring to an end what some have seen as a period of ‘extraordinary politics’ in which the Tunisian 
people actively reconstituted society.26 Despite its shortcomings, Tunisia’s is thus far the only instance of 
a successful transition amidst the Arab Spring countries, and as a consequence has been promoted as a 
model for the rest.27 The Nobel Prize Committee, awarding the Nobel Peace Prize for 2015 to the 
Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, praised it for having ‘paved the way for a peaceful dialogue 
between the citizens, the political parties and the authorities and helped to find consensus-based 
solutions to a wide range of challenges across political and religious divides.’28  
The reality of the Tunisian constitution-making process was, however, far messier. It was not 
immediately clear that a new constitution was to be drafted, with evidence suggesting that the initial 
transitional government had intended only to reform the 1959 constitution.29 Even once the constituent 
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assembly was in place, consensus could only be reached after significant bargaining between the main 
players: the majority Islamist block centred on the Ennahda party; the liberal, centre-left Union for 
Tunisia, the main (secular) opposition force; and the Popular Front, a smaller socialist and ecological 
block.30 The primary main source of tension during the constitution-making process was the place 
afforded religion in the new constitution. Despite early promises from the Ennahda party following its 
electoral success in the October 2011 elections that it would not seek to change the constitution to 
impose sharia, and from the opposition that it would not refer to secularism explicitly, as will be seen, 
the drafting process brought to light the deep fears and distrust held by the parties.31 These misgivings 
were not helped by the fact that a leaked early Ennahda draft of the constitution had actually included a 
sharia provision.32 Some scholars have argued that religion should not be viewed as the only division 
between the drafting parties, nor as one as rigid as it has been made to seem.33 It has instead been 
argued that a better predictor of the positions of political actors during Tunisia’s transitional period 
were economic cleavages, namely the stance on neoliberal reform agendas held by each party.34 Thus, 
despite the main aim of the Jasmine Revolution being economic, an economic revolution in Tunisia has 
been said to have been relegated to an elusive ‘second phase’.35 As the conclusion to this article shows, 
the consequences of this choice may be graver than anticipated. 
All actors involved in the Tunisian constitution-making process had to compromise on core demands in 
exchange for gains elsewhere. On the religious question, the main Islamist party Ennahda and secularist 
parties had to find common ground by giving in on issues such as whether to include references to 
sharia and the position attributed to human rights in the constitution, respectively.36 The bargain they 
struck is reflected in the unamendable provisions discussed shortly. Another, equally contested site of 
negotiations concerned the choice of system of government. Ennahda, relying on its projected strength 
at the polls, would have opted for a parliamentary system, whereas other, smaller parties thought a 
semi-presidential system in which the president was to be directly elected would give them a better 
chance to capture the office.37 Without compromises on these issues, achieved by way of many 
iterations of constitutional drafts debated extensively in the constituent assembly and within broader 
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society, there would not have been a ratified constitution. Indeed, bargaining dynamics and deal-making 
between moderates and the ruling elites38, including the non-exclusion of old elites from the political 
process39 and the ability of moderates to marginalise radicals on both sides40, have been heralded as key 
explanatory factors for the success of Tunisia’s transition more generally. The international community 
also pushed forward the constitution-making process. The United Nations, for example, did so not just 
by way of financial support, but also by various agencies sending letters and recommendations to 
members of the constituent assembly and to the government calling for the inclusion or modification of 
individual provisions on human rights or judicial independence.41 The Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe also intervened, at the request of the Tunisian government, by issuing a full report on a later 
draft of the constitution, indicating provisions it thought problematic from the point of view of 
international human rights standards.42 
Read in light of this complicated process, the new constitution’s provisions on unamendability gain new 
significance. When considered as part of such political pact-making, they appear as the culmination of 
strategic positioning by the parties to negotiations rather than, or alongside, being the embodiment of 
normative aspirations for the new polity.  
Up until the final debate in the plenary of the constituent assembly, drafts of the Tunisian constitution 
had included a separate eternity clause. As Table 1 shows, these iterations referred to the same issues 
(Islam as the religion of the state, Arabic as the official language, the nature of the state as republican 
and civil, human rights and freedoms, and presidential term limits) with little variation. This consistency 
may indicate early and persistent agreement among drafters as to the necessity of unamendability in 
their constitution, even while it did not survive in this form in the ratified constitution. 
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First Draft, 14 August 
2012 
Second Draft, 14 
December 2012 
Third Draft, 22 April 
2013 
Fourth Draft, 1 June 
2013 
Article 9.3 
Unamendable 
components 
No amendment to the 
Constitution may be 
prejudice to: 
- Islam, being the 
religion of the state. 
- The Arabic language, 
being the official 
language. 
- The republican nature 
of the regime. 
- The civil capacity of 
the state. 
- Human rights gains 
and freedoms 
guaranteed under the 
present Constitution. 
- The number and 
duration of presidential 
terms. Such may not be 
subject to increase. 
Article (148) 
No amendment to the 
Constitution may 
b[ring] prejudice to: 
- Islam, being the 
religion of the state. 
- The Arabic language, 
being the official 
language. 
- The republican nature 
of the regime. 
- The civil capacity of 
the state. 
- Gains of human rights 
and freedoms 
guaranteed under the 
present Constitution. 
- The number and 
duration of presidential 
terms. Such may not be 
subject to increase. 
Article 136 
Unamendable 
components 
No amendment to the  
Constitution may  bring 
prejudice to: 
- Islam, being the 
religion of the state.  
- The Arabic language, 
being the official 
language.  
- The republican 
system.  
- The state’s civil 
nature.  
- Acquired human rights 
and freedoms that are 
guaranteed under the 
present Constitution.  
-The number and 
duration of presidential 
terms, and their 
increase.  
Article 141 
Unamendable 
components 
No amendment to the  
Constitution 
may bring prejudice to: 
- Islam, being the 
religion of the state.  
- The Arabic language, 
being the official 
language.  
- The republican 
system.  
- The state’s civil 
nature.  
- Acquired human rights 
and freedoms that are 
guaranteed under the 
present Constitution.  
- The number and 
duration of presidential 
terms.  
Table 1. Iterations of the eternity clause in Tunisia’s constitutional drafts43 
In the end, Tunisian drafters resorted to attaching these declarations of unamendability individually to 
each affected article, rendering them now scattered throughout the text: in Article 1, which declares the 
characteristics of the Tunisian state (‘Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is Islam, 
its language Arabic, and its system is republican.’); in Article 2 on the civil nature of the state (‘Tunisia is 
a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the supremacy of law.’); in Article 49, the 
constitution’s general rights limitation clause (‘There can be no amendment to the Constitution that 
undermines the human rights and freedoms guaranteed in this Constitution.’); and finally in Article 75, 
banning amendments that would increase the number or length of presidential terms. The main reason 
for this drafting choice was to preserve the ambiguous formulation of Article 1. As it stands, and as it 
had been incorporated in the 1959 constitution, Article 1 leaves the reference to religion deliberately 
vague: it is unclear whether Islam is being mentioned as the religion of the state as political structure, or 
whether a statement of fact (Tunisia as a majority Islamic country) is meant instead (more on this in the 
following section). In each formulation in the four preceding drafts of the constitution, this ambiguity 
had been lost: Islam had been explicitly named as ‘the religion of the state’, and thus the initial function 
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played by Article 1—as a tool inducing early consensus and reassuring both Islamist and secularists that 
the constitution would preserve their interests—was lost. 
Another important concern for drafters was instituting a well-functioning, independent judiciary. A 
constitutional court with extensive competencies was to be set up (Title V. Part II of the constitution) 
and was to act as guarantor of the new democratic dispensation (see also Daly’s contribution in this 
issue). Its mandate includes ex ante and ex post constitutional review (Article 120), reviewing 
presidential impeachment (Article 88) and declarations of states of emergency (Article 80), and playing 
the role of arbiter in disputes over executive powers (Article 101). Previous drafts had narrower 
provisions on access to the court, for instance, only permitting the president to call for ex ante review.44 
The court replaced the previous, weaker Constitutional Council and was strongly advocated for by 
international actors, who promoted it as ‘a step towards establishing effective democratic institutions’45 
and as constituting now ‘a standard component of a democracy.’46 The Venice Commission, in an 
opinion on the draft constitution, welcomed the creation of the new court and its extensive 
competences but encouraged wider access to initiating constitutional review procedures.47 The reliance 
on entrenchment, including via unamendable provisions, goes hand in hand with the creation of a 
strong constitutional court which can give teeth to such commitments.48 The constitutional court has 
been entrusted with a key role in consolidating Tunisian democracy but two years since the entry into 
force of the new basic law, the parliament still had not passed the necessary law on the functioning of 
the court.49 
I will now turn to the principles declared unamendable by Tunisia’s basic law and examine the 
considerations behind their adoption, including bargains struck over their formulation. I will also briefly 
explore how similar provisions have fared in other contexts and draw out potential lessons for these 
clauses’ interpretation in future Tunisian constitutional jurisprudence. 
Unamendable state characteristics 
Certain characteristics of the Tunisian state are placed outside the power of amendment by Articles 1 
and 2 in the constitution. It will not be surprising that they, and especially Article 1, were among the 
most controversial during drafting given that they purport to delineate the state’s identity. Among the 
elements declared unamendable, the assertion of the state’s ‘free, independent, sovereign’ nature 
appears straightforward, as does the fact that it is ‘based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the 
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45
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Huffington Post Tunisie, 1 September 2015, available at http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/09/01/projet-
proposition-loi-cour-constitutionnelle_n_8071672.html. See also ‘Opinion on the Draft Institutional Law of the 
Constitutional Court of Tunisia Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 104th Plenary Session (Venice, 23-24 
October 2015), CDL-AD(2015)024, 26 October 2015. 
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supremacy of law’. They are akin to declarations of sovereignty and independence as being 
unamendable incorporated in several post-colonial or post-Soviet constitutions, such as in Article 292 of 
the constitution of Mozambique or in Article 114 of that of Armenia. Less clear is whether such 
declarations carry any more weight than they would were they incorporated in preambles. After all, the 
preservation of a country’s sovereignty and independence, just like of its territorial integrity (another 
principle occasionally listed as unamendable in the basic laws of newly independent states) will depend 
at least in part on external forces beyond the control of internal state organs.50  
Also seemingly uncontroversial is the declaration of the system of government as republican. A similar 
provision had been included in Tunisia’s former constitution, the 1959 post-independence text, under 
Article 76. It had entrenched the departure from the previous monarchical system and had been likely 
influenced by Tunisia’s colonial power, France, whose constitution states in Article 89 that: ‘The 
republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment.’ The unamendable 
commitment to republicanism is also among the most widespread eternity clauses, with one study 
counting more than 100 constitutions having such a clause.51 The origin of such clauses seems to be the 
fear of a return of the monarchy in the immediate aftermath of the transition to republicanism.52 For all 
its influence, both as a colonial power and as a widely imitated constitutional model, France’s 
experience with ‘eternal’ republicanism does not tell us very much about how such a clause might work 
in practice, including in Tunisia. This is because the Conseil Constitutionnel has consistently refused to 
engage in the review of constitutional amendments.53 However, while virtually eradicated in France, 
monarchism has not fully disappeared from other republics. For example, calls for monarchical 
restoration exist in Libya, where a constitutional monarchy has been advocated as the solution to the 
country’s turmoil.54 Thus, while republicanism may seem a particularly uncontested unamendable 
constitutional commitment, and raised little debate among Tunisian drafters, one cannot assume it is 
without consequence simply because a return to monarchy appears impossible at a given time. 
Moreover, whether the republicanism principle will have been trespassed will also depend on how 
broadly the constitutional court interprets such transgression. It could also be that curtailing rights of 
political participation or altering the separation of powers to such an extent as to de facto extinguish 
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popular sovereignty, or even the open-ended delegation of governmental authority55, would be deemed 
violations of the commitment to republicanism. 
Unamendable declarations of an official language such as Tunisia’s are to be found in a number of 
constitutions, including post-authoritarian ones.56 When commenting on the Tunisian draft, the Venice 
Commission thought ‘this provision requires no particular comment’,57 presumably because it deemed it 
a statement of fact in the same vein as that on an official religion (see below). Indeed, given the 
linguistic homogeneity of the country, Arabic may have been a unifying element of identity rather than a 
divisive one. Turkey, however, exemplifies how such a clause can result in discriminatory enforcement 
against minorities.58 The Turkish Constitutional Court has invoked the language element of the eternity 
clause to deem calls for the use of the Kurdish language ‘a display of separatism’ and direct affronts to 
the unity of the nation.59 Insofar as Tunisia’s eternity clause will not be similarly interpreted to 
discriminate against the language rights of minorities, its inclusion in the 2014 constitution will not pose 
immediate concern. 
By far the most disputed of all the elements of state identity rendered unamendable in the constitution 
has been the reference to religion in Article 1. Three aspects of Tunisia’s unamendable commitment to 
Islam are noteworthy. The first is that it was the result of much negotiation between opposing parties. 
Ennahda initially pursued the constitutionalisation of sharia but faced fierce opposition from civil society 
as well as from secularist parties. Ben Jafaar, the president of the constituent assembly, threatened to 
leave the coalition if the clause concerning sharia was not withdrawn; he referred to the provision on 
Tunisia being a civil state (Article 2) as a ‘red line not to be trespassed’.60 It may be true, as some have 
argued, that the main fault line during negotiations was not so much around religious issues, but around 
entrenching gains against the old elite.61 To Ennahda members and supporters, entrenching Islam may 
have amounted to a guarantee against persecution on religious grounds as the Ben Ali regime had 
engaged in. As such, entrenchment may have been less about ideology and more about adopting 
‘political “fencing” measures that would preserve the gains of the revolution and…keep the country 
from sliding back into an authoritarianism that targets religiously minded individuals’.62 The bargain 
between these two seemingly incompatible positions was reached in March 2012, when the Shura 
Council of the Ennahda party renounced the constitutionalisation of sharia in exchange for secularists 
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renouncing the constitutionalisation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and agreeing to 
language in the preamble that watered down the scope of rights protection (more on this shortly).63  
The second important aspect to note, then, is how Article 1’s mention of religion sits within the larger 
constitutional apparatus. Optimists view it as being tempered by the declaration of the state’s civil 
nature, although whether all sides mean the same thing when interpreting the principle of civil state is 
doubtful.64 The Venice Commission has attempted to reconcile official endorsements of religion with 
principles of non-discrimination. It found the declaration of an official religion in the Tunisian 
constitution of 2014 to be a mere statement of fact to the extent that it only recognises that Islam is the 
religion of the majority of citizens.65 However, the inclusion of this declaration as an unamendable 
principle, coupled with the unamendable civil nature of the state and with other provisions on religion in 
the constitution—notably Article 6, which stipulates that ‘The state is the guardian of religion.’—may 
become problematic.66 Tunisian authorities have explained the intent behind Article 6 to be for the state 
to be responsible for the maintenance of religious infrastructure and the remuneration of religious 
ministers, in line with similar provisions in other national constitutions.67 Nevertheless, the ambiguous 
language of the Tunisian text, coupled with potential incongruities between the various provisions on 
religion, may lead to discriminatory interpretation. This ambiguity has led one commentator to observe 
that: ‘The response of the Tunisian draft constitution to the fundamental question of the polity – a 
community of believers or citizens? – remains ambivalent.’68  
A third and final aspect worthy of mention here is the relationship between Article 1 in the constitution 
of 2014 and Article 1 in the 1959 constitution. Their language is identical, save for the inclusion of 
unamendability in the new constitution. However, there is more than meets the eye behind this 
resemblance. The mere fact of being able to discuss such core issues related to religion and identity was 
novel, with the chair of the Rights and Liberties Committee in the constituent assembly observing that 
‘[in the past] we couldn’t have a real conversation, let alone determine the boundaries of these issues.’69 
As stated, the language of the current Article 1 was chosen very carefully, however, so as to leave open 
whose religion Islam actually is: Tunisia’s (as a statement of fact) or the state’s (carrying with it the 
endorsement of state power). This has been deemed evidence of ‘strategic positioning’ of the drafters, 
resulting in normative flexibility.70 It clearly leaves the resolution of this ambiguity in concrete cases to 
the future constitutional court, whose role becomes that much more important.71 The new language 
may also be read as a correction, by way of constitutional law, of past constitutional jurisprudence. 
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Under the old constitution, the previous Article 1 had been interpreted as altering Tunisia’s Personal 
Status Law (which had instituted significant departures from Islamic family law) to limit inheritance, 
property, and various parental rights according to Islamic law.72 The identity in language between these 
two constitutions is therefore misleading if not analysed in the wider jurisprudential context. 
References to official religion as unamendable such as in Tunisia’s Article 1 are not unprecedented and 
parallels come in two guises: the entrenchment of an official religion73and the unamendable protection 
of secularism or of the separation of church and state.74 More problematic than Tunisia’s ambiguous 
reference to religion as unamendable are eternity clauses which entrench religious sources of law. For 
example, in Afghanistan’s 2004 post-conflict constitution, Article 149 reads, in part: ‘The principles of 
adherence to the tenets of the Holy religion of Islam as well as Islamic Republicanism shall not be 
amended.’ The problem with such a clause is that it raises the difficulty of delineating the boundaries of 
religious principles and their infringement. This difficulty is even more complex in the Afghan 
constitution, which combines Islam and international law as sources of law (Articles 3 and 7, 
respectively), without guidance as to how they are to be reconciled if in conflict.75 
Scholars have listed both official religion and secularism amidst the elements of preservative eternity 
clauses, seeing them as ‘an expression of the importance of religion or non-religion in that constitutional 
regime, either as a reflection only of the views of the constitutional drafters or of the views of citizens as 
well.’76 This argument is reminiscent of those who view religion as expressive of constitutional identity, 
whether by achieving official status or by its banishment from public life in the form of a commitment to 
secularism.77 Either way, the decision is viewed as fundamental to the nature of the state. The full 
significance of Tunisia’s unamendable commitment to Islam will only become apparent once interpreted 
in practice. Only once a challenge is brought and the constitutional court delineates the boundaries of 
this provision will we know whether the political agreement behind its current formulation in Article 1 
will hold. Only then will it be clearer whether it builds in eternal conflict or whether it enables the 
transformation of relationships or even a more modest achievement of stable government. 
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Unamendable human rights and freedoms 
Article 49 in the Tunisian constitution, the rights limitations clause, also precludes amendments that 
would ‘undermine the human rights and freedoms guaranteed in this Constitution.’ As noted above, 
individual rights protections were a battleground during constitutional negotiations, with secularists 
having to give ground in order for Islamists to back away from calls for the constitutionalisation of 
sharia. This tussle occurred not just over the eternity clause, but was also evident in compromises over 
the preamble, the freedom of conscience and belief, and the constitutional requirement to criminalise 
blasphemy. The preamble of the third draft, for example, referred to ‘[b]uilding on the fundamentals 
and the open and moderate objectives of Islam, on sublime human values, and on universal human 
rights that are in harmony with the Tunisian people’s cultural specificity’. This qualification of rights 
protections according to cultural specificities was opposed by lawyers and civil society members, as well 
as by international human rights organisations fearing that such language afforded authorities great 
discretion to limit human rights.78 The current preamble maintains a reference to ‘the teachings of 
Islam’ but removes references to cultural specificities as qualifiers of rights protections. The right to 
freedom of conscience and belief also only appeared in the final draft, after sustained pressure from 
domestic and international actors.79 Renouncing the criminalisation of blasphemy, however, may have 
been an even more difficult hurdle for Islamists to overcome. This constitutional commitment has been 
said to have amounted to a defensive stance of Ennahda members after years of abuses by the old 
regime.80 In the end, however, they compromised and accepted that the constitution was not the 
appropriate locus for such prohibitory language.81 Whether the balance between this issue and 
protections of freedom of expression and conscience has been struck coherently has been contested82 
and will become clearer once constitutional jurisprudence builds on this matter. 
Eternity clauses entrenching human rights commitments are numerous, in particular in post-conflict and 
post-authoritarian constitutions.83 The language used in these provisions differs considerably, however, 
ranging from provisions precluding any amendment to, more frequently, requirements that 
amendments not lessen human rights protection. A different, and arguably more rigid, type of such 
clause is Article X.2 of the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which stipulates that no amendment 
is possible to the provision enshrining the supremacy and direct applicability of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and its Protocols in the Bosnian constitutional system. 
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The preponderance of new democracies amidst countries on this list has led some scholars to interpret 
unamendable commitments to human rights as serving a transformative function: ‘These examples   
suggest how formal unamendability may be used to help transform a state’s default posture from rights 
infringement to rights enforcement.’84 However, Tunisia’s provision, and others’, speaks not of outright 
unamendability of human rights, but of a ban on amendments that would ‘undermine’ existing rights 
guarantees. This is not an unprecedented drafting choice and may also be found in other post-conflict 
constitutions, such as in Article 149(2) of Afghanistan’s basic law, which declares that: ‘The amendment 
of the fundamental rights of the people are permitted only in order to make them more effective.’ It is 
thus best understood as a ‘non-regression’ or ‘standstill’ clause.85 In other words, as instituting a 
minimum standard of rights protection rather than as rendering human rights and freedoms 
untouchable. Such an interpretation also seems to have been developed in the case of Germany’s Article 
79(3), with the German Constitutional Court having declared it to prohibit ‘a fundamental abandonment 
of the principles mentioned therein’.86 
How this provision will be interpreted in Tunisia’s context will therefore depend on how its 
constitutional court interprets the prohibition on ‘undermining’ rights.  However, given that the very 
wording itself signifies a compromise between two competing constitutional identities, the court’s role 
will inevitably be understood in political as well as legal terms, with reference to how it maintains or tilts 
the balance between secularist and Islamist interests. The Court is likely to take as its starting point a 
minimum standard of protection against which to evaluate new amendments, and if so, it might ground 
this standard in international law and comparative experience. Such transnational elements have come 
to permeate discussions of eternity clause enforcement in a number of different fora. These fora 
include: when a supranational human rights court has intervened in cases springing from the 
contestation of unamendable norms, such as the European Court of Human Rights in a case involving 
Turkey’s unamendable secularism87; when national courts themselves appeal to (and perhaps 
misrepresent) international human rights norms in order to justify changes to unamendable 
commitments, such as to executive term limits in Honduras (more on this below); and when 
international bodies evaluate the enforcement of unamendable provisions against a country’s 
international rule of law commitments, such as the Venice Commission with regard to Turkey.88 
Constitutional scholarship has started to take notice of these developments and to put forth defences of 
international interventions in this field89 or theories which suggest the appropriate limits, rooted in 
transnational values, of doctrines of unconstitutional constitutional amendment.90 In all these defences, 
eternity clauses have been interpreted as being in line with the country’s international commitments, 
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and the appeal to the transnational as essentially positive. One can also imagine international 
interventions frustrating, or being perceived as frustrating, good faith attempts at constitutional change 
which touch upon unamendable human rights commitments.91 The case of Sejdić and Finic, discussed 
more amply in Sapiano’s contribution to this issue, illustrates just how different national and 
international courts may reason when it comes to fundamental questions of a polity’s human rights 
commitments.92 Such disagreement may be unavoidable when courts are called upon to decide ‘first-
order’ questions of the constitutional system.93 It also cautions against expecting the inclusion of an 
unamendable minimum human rights standard in the constitution to lead to predictable and stable 
constitutional development in any given polity.  
Unamendable executive term limits 
Article 75 in Tunisia’s constitution contains one of the clearest instances of eternity clauses adopted for 
the purpose of protecting the integrity of the political settlement: unamendable executive term limits. 
The previous regime has been described as ‘one of the most personalistic’ models of authoritarian 
governance in the region94, with president Ben Ali repeatedly amending the 1959 constitution to allow 
for his re-election.95 In such a context, fears of the re-emergence of a strong-man regime dominated 
negotiations over limitations on executive powers, not just via Article 75, but also via the choice of semi-
presidentialism as the form of government.96 Similar considerations explain the adoption of clauses on 
unamendable executive terms in Latin American and African countries trying to overcome a history of 
executive overstay and coups.97   
Significantly, regional human rights bodies have also embraced prohibitions on amendments to 
executive term limits. Article 23 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, for 
example, lists ‘Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an 
infringement on the principles of democratic change of government’ as illegal and a cause for sanctions 
from the Union. The Venice Commission has defended executive term limits as ‘an important guarantee 
against any authoritarian dysfunctioning in a country’ and welcomed Tunisia’s Article 75 given that the 
country’s ‘democratic structures and their cultural foundations have not yet been consolidated.’98 
Scholars have similarly interpreted such clauses as inherently linked to countries’ experience with coups 
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and military rule and to their desire to create functioning democracies.99 They may be viewed as an 
extreme version of bans on executive term extension, which are quite common in constitutions around 
the world, especially in presidential and semi-presidential systems.100 The Twenty-second Amendment 
to the United States constitution, Article 6 of the French constitution and Article 52 of the German Basic 
Law are examples of such clauses in three of the most influential fundamental laws. Limitations on the 
number and length of term limits have been found to be on the rise,101 and they have come to be called 
‘one of the defining features of democracy’.102 
How unamendable term limits such as Tunisia’s work in practice is less straightforward, however. On the 
one hand, these types of rules present obvious advantages, particularly in the long run: ideally, they 
ensure rotation of office, limit incumbent advantage in elections, and encourage political competition; 
conversely, they can be viewed as an illiberal constraint on citizens’ choice, discouraging experienced 
governance and underestimating the potential disruptive role of ex-leaders, and are potentially 
abused.103 They are sometimes suspected of inducing constitutional predicaments rather than 
preventing them, because they may not reduce the likelihood of presidents overstaying—they merely 
transform presidential overstay into a more acute form of constitutional crisis.104 Some empirical studies 
testing these assumptions have called term limits ‘surprisingly effective in constraining executives from 
extending their terms, at least in democracies.’105 Moreover, the very bluntness, black and white nature 
of these rules may be linked to their successful enforcement.106 The same empirical studies, however, 
indicate that, while not ‘associated with the death or disability of democracy’, term limits may in some 
circumstances trigger early constitutional replacement.107  
Honduras’s 2009 constitutional crisis and deposition of President Manuel Zelaya may yield lessons for 
Tunisia’s emerging democracy. The Honduran crisis brought to the fore precisely how destabilising 
presidential term limits may be in a fragile democracy, especially when they are declared unamendable. 
Zelaya had attempted to organise a non-binding public consultation around the holding of a referendum 
on whether to set up a body tasked with changing the constitution’s term limit, but was opposed by the 
judiciary, parliament and the military. Despite his protestations to the contrary, many in the country saw 
this as Zelaya’s attempt to override the one-term limit. This included the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Honduran Supreme Court, which held that the proposed referendum could not go ahead as it was in 
breach of the constitutional term limit. The constitutional crisis resulted in the president’s forceful 
removal from office by the military and exile.108 A Supreme Court judge would justify this as nothing 
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more than the military carrying out a lawful arrest warrant109 and many agreed that, while the methods 
employed were unfortunate, there was also a very real threat to democracy had plans to override the 
executive term ban gone ahead.110  Others, however—including eventually the United States—
understood the arrest and removal of Zelaya as a form of coup or unconstitutional regime change. 
The role played in the crisis by the Honduran constitution’s eternity clause on executive term limits 
(Article 374) is therefore complicated.111 Some commentators saw the term limit provision and its 
double entrenchment as the immediate cause for the 2009 crisis precisely because it made for 
indeterminacy.112 Others were careful to distinguish between the substantive prohibition on term limit 
extension and the ‘second-order proscriptions on debate or proposal of amendments.’113 The latter 
opined that, while some core issues may best be protected by taking them off the table, term limits ‘do 
not seem so contentious as to prohibit all discussion of [such limits].’114 Others still, placing Honduras in 
a wider Latin American context, saw Zelaya’s bid as an effort at ‘constitutional subterfuge’: using the 
cover of legality to break down constitutional barriers to their re-election.115 Perhaps a more nuanced 
interpretation would be that the conflicting claims of legitimacy—Zelaya’s on the basis of his popularity 
in office and that of his opposition on the grounds of clear constitutional language—were not and could 
not be reconciled on the basis of the constitution’s eternity clause. The Supreme Court intervened in a 
context of deep political divisions within the country, attempting to halt the capture of the state by one 
side, and was thus accused of enabling its capture by the other. Whether the eternity clause, or any 
constitutional mechanism for that matter, could be relied on to resolve this type of fundamental dispute 
is doubtful. 
This reading may have been borne out by subsequent developments in Honduras. In a 2015 decision, 
the Constitutional Chamber of the Honduran Supreme Court (with a different composition to 2009) 
declared the ban on presidential re-election unconstitutional and effectively repealed article 239.116 It 
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found the article to be in conflict with the freedoms of speech and thought; to unduly limit political 
participation and debates; to be contrary to international human rights obligations; and to have been 
relevant at an earlier time, but no longer because Honduras had stabilized its democracy. Moreover, the 
court relied on the recommendations of the truth commission set up by Zelaya’s successor to clarify the 
events of 2009 and to make proposals meant to prevent such crises.117 The latter had found the actions 
of the military in ousting Zelaya to have been illegal and unjustifiable and called for comprehensive 
constitutional reform. This decision not only made curious use of the unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment doctrine—declaring a provision of the constitution itself unconstitutional, not an 
amendment—but it also invoked international human rights standards in a dubious manner, and 
possibly against their core purposes.118 It may also have shown unamendability to be surmountable 
when faced with enough political pressure and arguments about its newfound irrelevance.119 
Honduras’s case is instructive primarily in showing how serious the consequences of unamendable 
executive term limits can be, or else how limited their capacity to withstand pressures to capture the 
presidential office in divided societies. The inclusion of these clauses in the constitution may lead to 
crisis when actors wishing to repeal such an eternity clause gain sufficient power but find themselves in 
a standoff with other political actors or with the judiciary. The relevance of debates on the wisdom of 
entrenching executive term limits has been proven no more recently than during 2015, when a number 
of African countries struggled with contestations of limits on presidential re-election. For example, the 
announcement that Burundi’s president would seek a third term in violation of the constitutional limit of 
two sparked violent clashes in the country; it was subsequently approved by the country’s Constitutional 
Court but challenged before the Court of the East African Community in July 2015.120 Rwanda’s 
president similarly set in motion a process of constitutional change when he indicated a wish to be 
elected for a third term.121 While these two post-conflict constitutions do not formally render term 
limits unamendable, they serve to highlight the continued relevance of constitutional mechanisms for 
containing executive usurpation.122 It is unsurprising, therefore, that Tunisia, a country emerging from 
decades of authoritarian rule, would seek to protect its nascent multiparty democracy by entrenching 
limits on executive power. Whether those limits could withstand a crisis such as Honduras’s is not a 
given and will depend to a great extent on balance of power considerations at the time. 
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Unamendable amnesties 
Also potentially attractive to post-conflict and post-authoritarian constitution-makers are amnesties 
absolving certain groups and their leaders from responsibility for past actions. The constitutionalisation 
of amnesties for human rights violations was first achieved in South Africa, where it was made 
conditional upon the fulfilment of certain conditions such as public apology and voluntary confession.123 
Amnesties have been elevated to unamendability in basic laws such as the 2010 constitution of Niger or 
the 2013 Fijian basic law.124 The former protected Article 185, which had declared that ‘An amnesty is 
granted to the authors, co-authors and accomplices of the coup d’état of eighteen (18) February 2010.’ 
The latter included extensive provisions on immunities and amnesties for conduct during the 2006 Fijian 
coup d’état and declared a 2010 decree having provided for these immunities and amnesties as not 
subject to review (Chapter X).  In Tunisia, the approach taken was precisely to stipulate that no 
amnesties would prevent transitional justice (Article 148(9)), although that article was not declared 
unamendable.125  
Amnesties may be viewed as the best example of how the normative aspirations of a constitution—to 
the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights protections—come into tension with 
the elite deals necessary for political settlements in post-conflict settings. On the one hand, the 
intention behind the entrenchment of such amnesties seems clear: it provides guarantees to formerly 
warring parties that they will not face prosecution once the new constitution comes into force and as 
such ensures their buy-in for the broader political settlement. Some scholars agree and view these as a 
separate type of eternity clause they call ‘reconciliatory’, whose aim is: 
to avoid a contentious and potentially destabilizing criminal or civil prosecution of wrongdoers 
by putting prosecution off the table altogether. The goal is instead to allow opposing factions to 
start afresh, free from threat of legal action, and sometimes in tandem with a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to give victims the opportunity to air their views and to record their 
memories but without invoking the consequence of legal duty and violation.126 
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Other scholars, writing on the Fijian provisions, point to their origin in backlash against a Court of Appeal 
decision declaring the 2006 seizure of power as illegal; the 2013 Fijian constitution thus sought to 
legitimate the regime but also to curtail the expansion of judicial power.127 
On the other hand, the constitutionalisation of amnesties will not extinguish the complexity involved in 
addressing past wrongdoings during post-conflict transitions. The South African Constitutional Court 
acknowledged as much in a case involving a challenge to amnesties for criminal and civil liabilities 
granted to perpetrators having disclosed the truth about past atrocities.128 The Court upheld the 
granting of amnesties but limited its analysis to a review of constitutionality, while at the same time 
acknowledging that the case involved 
a difficult, sensitive, perhaps even agonising, balancing act between the need for justice to 
victims of past abuse and the need for reconciliation and rapid transition to a new future… It is 
an act calling for a judgment falling substantially within the domain of those entrusted with law-
making in the era preceding and during the transition period.129 
In other words, the Court deferred judgment on the appropriateness of amnesties as reconciliation 
devices to lawmakers and restrained its own intervention on the matter to a constitutionality check, but 
perhaps with inadequate consideration of international human rights law.  
Unamendability in this case thus primarily serves to indicate the commitment of drafters to maintaining 
amnesties beyond the ratification of the new constitution. Such pledges are especially important to 
minority or weaker parties, who may otherwise fear that the majority would amend constitutional 
amnesties once the basic law is ratified. The granting of amnesties in general carries legitimacy problems 
which hark back to peace versus justice debates and to controversies over the rise of individual criminal 
responsibility in international law.130 Alternatively, problems may arise if an eternity clause enshrining 
amnesties is one-sided, for instance where amnesties are granted to one party to the conflict but not to 
the other. The few examples of unamendable amnesties we have thus far suggest that the primary 
objective behind their adoption is reaching agreement around a political settlement and the legitimation 
of a new regime, all of which are sought before the adoption of the new constitution. How such 
unamendability would fare were it to be seriously contested post-ratification remains at the level of 
speculation for now. Without a doubt, however, any such contestation would expose the uneasy 
relationship between the political agreement having made the constitution possible and the latter’s 
normative aspirations. 
 
 
                                                          
127
 Ginsburg and Ngenge (2014), p. 32. 
128
 Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1996 
(4) SA 672 (CC), 25 July 1996. 
129
 Ibid., para 21. 
130
 See discussions in Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne, Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 and Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for 
Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
24 
 
IV. Alternatives to unamendability in post-conflict constitution-making 
Given the many unknowns of unamendability highlighted in section III, and the possibility that it fails to 
conserve the consensus which makes the constitution possible, are there more attractive design tools 
which may achieve the same endurance of the political settlement while avoiding the pitfalls of too rigid 
a constitution? Conversely, is the entire pursuit of one or more discrete institutions of constitutional 
survival misdirected? Given the fragility of post-conflict and post-authoritarian political settlements and 
the weak institutional milieus in which they operate, should we instead focus on strategies to bring 
about a democratic constitutional culture rather than on placing certain commitments outside the reach 
of constitutional amendment? Are there constitutional design options which combine these two aims? 
These questions will be briefly explored here, with the caveat that this is merely a preliminary foray into 
the matter. The discussion is intended to place eternity clauses within a broader constellation of 
constitutional mechanisms for entrenchment or expression and as such to raise questions about the 
utility of resorting to unamendability. References are again made to the Tunisian case and, where 
evidence of this exists, to the concrete reasons why drafters there discarded these alternatives and 
chose unamendability instead. The reader should not expect prescriptions based on this unavoidably 
cursory exploration, but begin considering what renders the promise of eternity clauses distinctive as a 
tool for reaching and entrenching political settlements in transitional contexts. 
Interim constitutions 
Several alternative institutions have been used with a view to preserving an initial agreement. One such 
tool, interim constitutions, has been discussed in detail by Rodrigues in this issue and by other 
scholars.131 They act as mediating tools, gaining more time for the constitution-making process, and may 
facilitate the adoption of ‘a more durable and more optimized constitution’.132 Rodrigues’s argument—
that given the extremely fluid political and security environments in which post-conflict constitution-
making occurs, the drafting process itself should have some in-built fluidity such as the use of an interim 
constitution—resonates with other scholars’ advocacy for a ‘multi-track constitutionalism’.133 It is an 
argument with particular relevance to eternity clauses and can work in two ways. Insofar as eternity 
clauses aim to insulate from amendment values or principles deemed essential to the polity, their 
drafting may benefit from a more inclusive and transparent process once conditions on the ground are 
more stable. A society-wide debate on whether unamendable language or religion are opportune may 
stand better chances of taking place once the situation has become more peaceful in the country.  
Conversely, interim constitutions may themselves contain unamendable commitments which are then 
taken up, or not, in the permanent constitution. This was in a sense the method adopted in South 
Africa134  and arguably, given the initial temporary nature of the Basic Law, in Germany.135 An interim 
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constitution may have the advantage of securing consensus around certain non-negotiable principles 
without which there may not be any political settlement at all. Given that the 1996 South African 
constitution does not contain an eternity clause, the inclusion of such immutable principles in its 1993 
interim constitution (Section 74) functioned similarly to a sunset clause. The permanent South African 
constitution includes a differentiated amendment procedure with a high threshold of seventy-five per 
cent for amendments to Article 1, which lists the values underpinning the state, the supremacy of the 
constitution, citizenship, the national anthem and flag, and the official languages, and to Article 74, 
which stipulates the amendment procedure itself. Thus, constitution-makers in South Africa opted for a 
high degree of entrenchment of certain values but not complete unamendability. They also entrusted 
the interpretation of the new constitution to an empowered constitutional court, whose task it would 
be to act as guarantor of rights and democracy.136  
After the Jasmine Revolution, the newly-elected Tunisian legislature also assumed the role of 
constituent assembly, invalidated the 1959 constitution, and instituted a provisional legal regime, under 
which the basics of power arrangements in the state were stipulated together with the working rules of 
the constituent assembly itself.137 This transitional legal regime has been criticised as insufficient for the 
needs of the post-authoritarian Tunisian context and as containing discriminatory provisions, and the 
absence of a mechanism of judicial review has in particular been pointed to as problematic.138 
Presumably, drafters were well aware of the option of adopting more comprehensive interim legal 
provisions. Neighbouring Egypt had itself adopted a fraught Constitutional Declaration in March 2011 
and Iraq had also experimented with the well-known (and also fraught) Transitional Administrative Law. 
The level of detail and scope of issues covered by interim constitutions in conflict-affected states has 
historically varied,139 and Tunisia’s choice to invest its post-revolutionary energy into drafting a new 
permanent constitution was likely a deliberate choice.  
Sunset clauses 
Sunset clauses are another alternative to eternity clauses and may be understood as mechanisms of 
temporary absolute rigidity which are set to expire at a given point in time or once certain conditions 
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have been fulfilled.140 One of the best known examples of constitutional sunset clauses was 
incorporated into the constitution of the United States: amendments to Article I, Section 9, clauses 1 
and 4, which protected the importation of slaves and prohibited some capitation taxes, were prohibited 
until 1808.141 The lineage of this type of law-making, however, goes back as far as ancient Athens, and 
continues to be employed in constitutional design today.142 The presumed advantage of sunset clauses 
is that they allow stability to trump constitutional flexibility, but not indefinitely. The implicit 
suppositions behind their use are that something significant will change in the intervening period, that 
entrenchment is required during democratic consolidation but will not be later, and that the need for 
‘gag rules’ will diminish and spirits will cool.143 Jennifer Widner has highlighted the potential utility of 
sunset clauses in post-conflict situations for precisely their capacity to reduce passions and has given the 
examples of South Africa, Bougainville, and Uganda as places where sunset clauses have played a 
positive role in constitutional transitions.144 Interestingly, the second Tunisian draft had included a 
sunset clause alongside an unamendability provision, banning amendments for a period of five years 
after the constitution would enter into force.145 Entrenching the hard-fought gains of the drafting 
process was clearly on the minds of its architects.  
When compared to eternity clauses, on their face, sunset provisions seem to achieve many of the same 
objectives without the downsides of long-term rigidity: they may facilitate and safeguard initial 
agreement without frustrating constitutional evolution further down the road. However, to the extent 
that unamendability is resorted to precisely so as to preclude any renegotiation of principles, 
irrespective of democratic consolidation or any changes in circumstances, then sunset clauses may not 
be adequate replacements. Indeed, sunset clauses themselves have been viewed as especially rigid 
constraints on future generations to the extent that they may trigger the artificial abandonment of an 
otherwise well-functioning constitution.146 More significant, however, is the fact that sunset clauses are 
accompanied by much insecurity: the delicate balance of powers achieved at the time of drafting the 
constitution may change dramatically by the time a sunset clause is set to expire. Parties to a political 
settlement may thus not wish to take the risk of their initial bargain unravelling in a context in which 
they do not wield sufficient power and may opt for permanent unamendability instead. In Tunisia’s case, 
the final compromise on Article 1 may be especially sensitive to changes in the balance of power, as may 
be the unamendable presidential term limit. 
Deferral 
Other means of reaching agreement over a constitution which may function as alternatives to 
unamendability may be less obvious. One mechanism would be deferral, understood as the deliberate 
choice of drafters to postpone deciding on certain contentious elements of constitutional design and 
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defensible on grounds similar to those underpinning sunset clauses: that a solution can be reached once 
passions subside. There is some evidence that in cases where deferral was not embraced in the 
constitutional design, the likelihood of ‘significant pressures for whole-scale constitutional replacement, 
as opposed to amendment’ increased.147  
Applying this to eternity clauses which were adopted in a non-inclusive, contested manner, one might 
expect them to be the source of continued instability in the polity and potentially to trigger early 
constitutional replacement. More generally, the literature on incrementalism suggests that not deciding 
everything during drafting may allow for the gradual development of consensus which a more specific 
initial draft would preclude.148 However, in cases where no initial consensus is possible without certain 
ironclad guarantees, included in the eternity clause, prospects for more consensus down the line may 
not be better. To the extent that unamendable provisions in the constitution provide assurances 
without which constitutional negotiations would break down, deferral of the principles these provisions 
enshrine may not be a feasible solution. Considering this option in the case of Tunisia, it is impossible to 
imagine a political settlement being reached at all if the most contentious issues during negotiations, 
later declared unamendable, had been postponed. The climate of insecurity and distrust among the 
political actors have likely prevented deferral from amounting to a meaningful constitutional design 
option, at least with regard to the elements of the eternity clause. 
Ambiguity 
Similar to deferral is deliberate ambiguity in constitutional language. It is a mechanism for 
accommodating diversity in spite of deep uncertainty at the time of drafting a new constitution. The 
Indian constitution, for example, had to fit but also unify a diverse society rife with religious, social, 
ethnic, linguistic, and regional tensions, a mission accomplished via what one scholar has termed 
‘constructive ambiguity’: embracing such conflicts and importing them into the constitution via the 
deliberately ambiguous formulation of constitutional provisions.149 This was a strategy to accommodate 
diversity and allow room for the uncertainties at the time of founding (such as the fate of Muslims in 
newly independent India) and led to the development of a distinctive type of legal pluralism.150 
Ambiguity has broader application and has been used as a tool in the constitutional adjudication of 
contentious issues such as sub-national secessionist claims.151  
In a sense, ambiguity is already embedded in eternity clauses by their very nature: unamendable 
commitments to democracy, the rule of law, or human rights will only lose their vagueness once 
operationalized in legislation or case law. In the case of other unamendable provisions such as executive 
term limits, it is precisely their unambiguous statement which renders them appealing to drafters. 
However, describing the relationship between the state and an official religion or language in more 
ambiguous language such as in the Tunisian constitution does may leave room for more inclusive 
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constitutional evolution. This ‘semantic ambiguity’ in the Tunisian constitution was a deliberate choice 
made by drafters who sought compromise on the religious framework, and was coupled with the 
‘terminological polysemy of Article 6’ (which declares the state the ‘guardian of the sacred’).152 This 
shows ambiguity to not necessarily be an alternative to eternity clauses but to be compatible with them. 
Silence 
Both deferral and ambiguity are cousins of another, perhaps more controversial drafting technique: 
constitutional silence. Also termed ‘abeyances’, constitutional silences have been explored as useful in 
mediating constitutional crises.153 They have been referred to as ‘an intermediate layer of obscurity’, 
between uncodified custom and positive law, which ‘accommodates those implicit understandings and 
tacit agreements that could never survive the journey into print without compromising their capacious 
meanings and ruining their effect as a functional form of genuine and valued ambiguity.’154 Vicki Jackson 
has also recently speculated on the potential usefulness of silence in constitution-making.155  
Thus, whereas deferral postpones decisions on disputed matters and ambiguity addresses them in 
purposefully obscure language, constitutional silence implies drafters say nothing at all on a particular 
issue. In that way, it is the starkest alternative to eternity clauses. In practice, opting for silence might 
take the form of no provision at all on official languages, religion, or on other controversial state 
characteristics. Presumably, some of these could be legislated on at a later time, but not 
constitutionalising them may lower the stakes of such later negotiations. However, the meaning of 
silence in the constitutional text will invariably depend upon its subsequent interpretation. This would in 
turn raise the stakes of negotiations over the body entrusted with such interpretation, presumably a 
constitutional court, with the battleground over safeguarding the political settlement fought over issues 
of judicial appointments, independence, and powers. This is already apparent in Tunisia, where the draft 
law to finally establish the new constitutional court has generated fierce debate. Moreover, the same 
conditions of uncertainty which reduced the likelihood of drafters in post-conflict settings resorting to 
deferral or ambiguity may also apply to silence. To the extent that their concern is precisely with 
enshrining the hard-fought political agreement into the constitution, they are unlikely to be content 
with not doing this explicitly, or to risk its undoing by way of later judicial interpretation.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The recourse to constitutional unamendability has hitherto been explained on mostly normative 
grounds and in terms that emphasise the importance of fundamental value commitments for the 
development and endurance of constitutionalism in a given order. Less attention has been paid to 
eternity clauses as tools of elite pacting, particularly in post-conflict settings. As Jonathan Di John and 
James Putzel remind us, the political settlements which precede the ratification of new constitutions 
should not be idealised as embodying a ‘common understanding between elites’ – they are instead the 
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result of arduous bargaining and contending claims that are resolved only partially and incrementally.156 
This article has argued that these bargains are especially difficult during transitional constitution-
making, and that unamendability in such constitutions plays a distinctive role. Eternity clauses thus 
serve as guarantees which facilitate the pre-constitutional political agreement necessary for the 
constitution to come into being, and offer reassurance to parties that their interests will not be 
amended out of the fundamental law once it is adopted. It is a promise which other, less rigid 
mechanisms of constitutional design may not be able fulfil. Moreover, by exploring other transitional 
contexts where eternity clauses have been adopted, this article has argued that these provisions may 
have unpredictable consequences. In other words, unamendable provisions may facilitate an initial 
political settlement, but the latter’s survival will nevertheless depend on subsequent dynamics 
(especially their interpretation by constitutional courts). 
The case of Tunisia has been used as illustration for the distinctive problems and prospects of 
unamendability in a transitional constitution. The 2014 constitution has been heralded as a significant 
achievement on the country’s path to democratisation. Commitments to human rights standards and 
the curtailment of executive power were hard-fought and may be seen as attempts to minimise the risk 
of authoritarian backsliding. However, this article has shown that other unamendable provisions on the 
identity of the state, notably its relationship to religion, may prove to be more problematic because they 
speak to on-going contestation and a fragile elite pact over the nature of the state. The ability of such 
clauses to protect the political settlement can only be proven in practice and depends on constitutional 
interpretation. Given that the law on a Tunisian constitutional court has still not been adopted as of the 
time of writing means there is still some way to go before constitutional jurisprudence can shed light on 
these issues. The constitution’s capacity to balance forces within Tunisian society may be tested sooner 
than its drafters may have expected, however. Threats to the delicate bargains struck in the constitution 
already loom, such as the rise of the radical Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia, spurred by Salafism’s appeal 
to marginalised groups,157 or the parliamentary crisis triggered by the November 2015 resignation of 
members of parliament due to fears that the president was trying to institute a new dynasty.158 How 
Tunisia’s constitution fares in the face of such challenges will tell us much, not just about the utility of 
eternity clauses in transitional constitution-making, but about the capacity of constitutions themselves 
to safeguard the political settlements which made them possible in the first place. 
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